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Straying from the Written Path: How the Supreme Court 
Eviscerated the Plain Meaning of the MVRA’s Ninety-Day 
Deadline Provision and Legislated from the Bench in Dolan 
v. United States 
I. Introduction 
A statutory interpretation scholar once quipped, “Federal statutes do not 
come with instructions, but maybe they should.”1  Such a remark reflects the 
confused feeling that many members of the legal profession experience when 
trying to understand the Supreme Court’s method of statutory interpretation.2  
Although members of courts employ various methods to interpret statutes, 
techniques can generally be broken down into two approaches: textualist and 
traditional.3  The textualist approach focuses “on the ‘plain meaning’ of the 
language of the statute.”4  The traditional approach considers contextual 
evidence such as legislative history in addition to a statute’s text, regardless 
of the presence of any “plain meaning.”5  The issue of statutory interpretation 
may be contentious at the best of times, but this tension is magnified when 
interpreting the Mandatory Victims’ Restitution Act (MVRA)—a statute that 
represents one of the most aggressive legislative moves to ensure victims’ 
rights in criminal law. 
Passage of the MVRA in 1996 was the legislative pinnacle of the Victims’ 
Rights Movement, which arose from victims’ frustration over their lack of 
participation in the criminal justice system, especially as it pertained to 
offenders.6  The passage of the MVRA signaled a change in the direction of 
criminal law at the federal level: restitution would no longer be a form of 
punishment, but would rather be a means for providing compensation to 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. 
L. REV. 2085, 2086 (2002).  
 2. See, e.g., Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory 
Interpretation Methodology?, 96 GEO. L.J. 1863, 1866 (2008) (noting that “the Court’s practice 
of treating doctrines of statutory interpretation differently than other legal doctrines with 
respect to stare decisis is deeply puzzling”).   
 3. See Rebecca L. Spiro, Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Rehnquist Court: 
Theories of Statutory Interpretation, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 103, 104 (2000).  
 4. Id. at 105. 
 5. Id. at 106.  
 6. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Redefining Roles: The Victims’ Rights Movement, 1985 
UTAH L. REV. 517, 525-26.  
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2012
212 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:211 
 
 
victims of certain crimes.7  At the heart of the MVRA was the mandatory 
requirement that courts order defendants to pay restitution to their victims for 
certain crimes.8  By 2010, several of the United States Courts of Appeals had 
come to a split in opinion concerning the implications of missing the 
restitution deadline provision in the MVRA.9  The Supreme Court confronted 
this split in Dolan v. United States.10   
In Dolan, the Court addressed the issue of whether a trial court is stripped 
of its authority to order restitution if it misses the MVRA deadline for doing 
so.11  The Court classified the restitution deadline provision of the MVRA as 
a speed-seeking deadline and discussed the purpose of the MVRA and its 
legislative history, before concluding that missing the deadline does not 
deprive a court of its authority to enter an order of restitution.12 
This note argues that the decision reached by the majority in Dolan was 
incorrect.  The Court erred by ignoring the plain meaning of the language in 
the MVRA, which ultimately led the Court to violate the constitutional 
principle of separation of powers.  Part II of this note provides a brief 
overview of the MVRA and its predecessor, the Victims and Witness 
Protection Act, as well as a quick overview of the social movement that led to 
their passage.  Part III provides three examples of cases in which the 
Supreme Court has previously determined the penalty for missing statutory 
deadlines.  Part IV discusses Dolan and the Court’s rationale for its decision.  
Part V argues that the majority in Dolan erred by ignoring the plain meaning 
of the language of the MVRA and allowing the legislative intent behind the 
MVRA to guide the Court’s reasoning.  Additionally, Part V argues that after 
straying from the clear text of the MVRA that requires a court to order 
restitution within ninety days of sentencing, the majority erred by refusing to 
utilize the rule of lenity to clarify any ambiguity that may have existed in the 
MVRA.  In so doing, the Court violated the bedrock constitutional principle 
                                                                                                                 
 7. Beth Bates Holliday, Annotation, Who Is a “Victim” Entitled to Restitution Under 
the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (18 U.S.C.A. § 3663A), 26 A.L.R. FED. 2d 
283, 283 (2008).  
 8. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1) (2000).  
 9. Compare United States v. Balentine, 569 F.3d 801, 807 (8th Cir. 2009) (finding 
authority for the court to enter restitution past the ninety-day statutory deadline), and United 
States v. Cheal, 389 F.3d 35, 37 (1st Cir. 2004) (same), with United States v. Farr, 419 F.3d 
621, 626 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding no authority for the court to enter restitution past the 
ninety-day deadline), and United States v. Maung, 267 F.3d 1113, 1122 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(same).  
 10. 130 S. Ct. 2533, 2537 (2010).   
 11. See id.  
 12. See id. at 2539.  
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of separation of powers by legislating from the bench.  Finally, Part V argues 
that the Court made an error by relying too heavily on Montalvo-Murillo as a 
parallel case, implicitly analogizing the common law goal of punishing an 
offender to the MVRA’s legislative goal of promoting restitution.  Part VI 
concludes this note.  
II. Overview of the MVRA and the Events Leading up to Its Passage 
A. The Victims’ Rights Movement 
The exact point when the Victims’ Rights Movement (VRM) began is not 
known.13  During the 1960s and 1970s, however, when Chief Justice Earl 
Warren and the Supreme Court began issuing opinions that expanded rights 
for the criminally accused, crime victims and their advocates began rallying 
for the rights of victims in the system.14  Today, the VRM has grown into “a 
legislative movement to codify the ‘rights’ of crime victims.”15  The VRM is 
identified with a sense of frustration over the lack of participation victims 
have in the criminal justice system with respect to the alleged or convicted 
offender.16  The VRM’s appeal cuts across a wide spectrum of advocates, 
with supporters of victims’ rights coming from a variety of political and 
economic backgrounds.17   
Between 1973 and 1983, the VRM’s success was readily apparent in the 
increased number of organizations and agencies dedicated to victims’ 
rights.18  In 1982, President Reagan commissioned the Task Force on Victims 
of Crime, which held “public hearings throughout the country, thereby 
focusing national attention on the problems crime victims suffer.”19  The 
Task Force found:  
[S]omewhere along the way, the system has lost track of the 
simple truth that it is supposed to be fair and protect those who 
obey the law while punishing those who break it.  Somewhere 
                                                                                                                 
 13. LEIGH GLENN, VICTIMS’ RIGHTS xiii (1997).  
 14. Id.  
 15. Sara Manaugh, The Vengeful Logic of Modern Criminal Restitution, 1 LAW, 
CULTURE & HUMAN. 359, 368 (2005).  
 16. Id. at 370. 
 17. See Abrahamson, supra note 6, at 525-26; see also Edna Erez & Julian Roberts, 
Victim Participation in the Criminal Justice System, in VICTIMS OF CRIME 277, 279 (Robert 
C. Davis, Arthur J. Lurigio & Susan Herman eds., 3d ed. 2007).    
 18. Abrahamson, supra note 6, at 528-29. 
 19. GLENN, supra note 13, at 63.  
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along the way, the system began to serve lawyers and judges and 
defendants, treating the victim with institutionalized disinterest.20   
With decades of momentum on its side, the VRM achieved what was 
perceived as a significant victory with the passage of the Victim and Witness 
Protection Act of 1982. 
B. The Victim and Witness Protection Act (1982) 
In 1982, just as the “plight of the victim, the ‘forgotten person,’” entered 
the “forefront of the public’s consciousness,”21 Congress enacted the Victim 
and Witness Protection Act (VWPA) in an attempt “to address the unmet 
needs of crime victims.”22  Specifically, Congress expressed intent to 
“strengthen existing legal protections for victims and witnesses of Federal 
crimes.”23 
The VWPA was a significant step in changing the landscape of criminal 
punishment.  Congress recognized that restitution had played an integral role 
in the criminal justice system of every culture at every point in time.24  The 
principle of restitution, according to Congress, holds that “whatever else the 
sanctioning power of society does to punish wrongdoers, it should also insure 
that the wrongdoer is required to the degree possible to restore the victim to 
his or her prior state of well-being.”25  
Prior to the VWPA, restitution in criminal law was only “an optional 
condition of probation.”26  Under the VWPA, however, federal courts were 
authorized to require restitution independent of probation.27  The VWPA did 
not require a court to order restitution.  Thus, the power to order restitution 
was discretionary.  However, the VWPA did require that when a court 
                                                                                                                 
 20. OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 
VICTIMS OF CRIME vi (1982), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/presd 
ntstskforcrprt/welcome.html.   
 21. Lorraine Slavin & David J. Sorin, Congress Opens a Pandora’s Box – The 
Restitution Provisions of the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, 52 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 507, 507 (1984). 
 22. Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Restitution in the Federal Criminal Justice System, 77 
JUDICATURE 90, 90 (1993).  
 23. S. REP. NO. 97-532, at 9 (1982). 
 24. See id. at 30. But see 66 AM. JUR. 2D Restitution and Implied Contracts § 1 (2001) 
(omitting any reference to punishment in discussion of historical definition and nature of 
restitution).   
 25. S. REP. NO. 97-532, at 30.  
 26. Tobolowsky, supra note 22, at 91.   
 27. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3579-3580 (1985). 
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declines to order restitution, the court must state the reasons for not doing so 
on the record,28 which applied pressure to courts to order restitution. 
In addition to having discretion in determining whether restitution will be 
ordered, the judge also had discretion in the amount ordered.  The VWPA 
required judges to consider “the amount of the victim’s loss from the offense, 
the defendant’s financial resources, and the financial needs and earning 
ability of the defendant and his or her dependants.”29  Thus, restitution under 
the VWPA was not really victim-centered as much as it was contingent upon 
the defendant’s circumstances and ability to pay.30 
C. The Mandatory Victims’ Restitution Act (1996) 
Addressing concerns that the VWPA left too much discretion to judges in 
awarding restitution, Congress enacted the Mandatory Victims’ Restitution 
Act (MVRA) in 1996 to “reflect a fundamental shift in the purpose of 
restitution from a means of punishment and rehabilitation to an attempt to 
provide those who suffer the consequences of crime with some means of 
recouping their personal and financial losses.”31  Congress noted that “[i]t is 
essential that the criminal justice system recognize the impact that crime has 
on the victim, and, to the extent possible, to ensure that [the] offender be held 
accountable to repay those costs.”32  
Specifically, the MVRA expands the VWPA in two ways.  First, whereas 
restitution was discretionary under the VWPA, federal courts are obligated to 
order restitution under the MVRA.33  Second, the MVRA provides that “[i]n 
each order of restitution, the court shall order restitution to each victim in the 
full amount of each victim’s losses as determined by the court and without 
consideration of the economic circumstances of the defendant.”34  Thus, 
while the VWPA allowed a judge to take the defendant’s financial 
circumstances into consideration when deciding the amount of restitution, 
such consideration is not permitted under the MVRA.  The defendant is 
required to make full restitution to the victim.  
                                                                                                                 
 28. Id. § 3579. 
 29. Id. § 3580(a).  
 30. See Mathew Dickman, Should Crime Pay?: A Critical Assessment of the Mandatory 
Victims Restitution Act of 1996, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1687, 1688 (2009). 
 31. Holliday, supra note 7, at 283. 
 32. S. REP. NO. 104-179, at 18 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924, 930.  
 33. 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1) (2000).  
 34. Id. § 3664(f)(1)(A) (emphasis added).  
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In order to ensure that victims receive full restitution, the MVRA included 
a provision that extends the time period during which the court may obtain 
pertinent information concerning the amount of restitution needed:  
If the victim’s losses are not ascertainable by the date that is 10 
days prior to sentencing, the attorney for the government or the 
probation officer shall so inform the court, and the court shall set a 
date for the final determination of the victim’s losses, not to 
exceed 90 days after sentencing.35  
Furthermore, Congress included a safe harbor provision for the discovery 
of new losses relating to restitution in order to ensure that victims were fully 
compensated: 
If the victim subsequently discovers further losses, the victim shall 
have 60 days after discovery of those losses in which to petition 
the court for an amended restitution order. Such order may be 
granted only upon a showing of good cause for the failure to 
include such losses in the initial claim for restitutionary relief.36 
Thus, although there is a deadline for ordering restitution, the MVRA’s 
safe harbor provision ensures that insufficiencies in the amount of restitution 
ordered could be rectified after the ninety-day deadline expires.  
III. The Supreme Court’s Categorical Approach to Missed 
Deadline Sanctions 
Prior to Dolan, the Supreme Court had already decided several cases 
relating to penalties for missed statutory deadlines.37  The Court’s analysis in 
Dolan began by determining whether the MVRA deadline is a speed-seeking, 
claims-processing, or jurisdictional deadline.38  The following discussion 
provides an overview of the three deadline cases that the Supreme Court cited 
in its decision in Dolan.  
  
                                                                                                                 
 35. Id. § 3664(d)(5).  
 36. Id.  
 37. See, e.g., Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007) (ruling that missed 
jurisdictional deadlines strip a court of its authority to act pursuant to the relative provision); 
Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 19 (2005) (ruling that claims-processing deadlines 
provide relief to parties properly raising the lapsed deadline as a defense before a trial court 
has reached the merits); United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 711, 722 (1990) 
(ruling that missing a “speed seeking” deadline does not strip a court of authority to act).  
 38. See Dolan v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2533, 2538 (2010).  
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A. United States v. Montalvo-Murillo: Speed-Seeking Deadlines 
In United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, the Court contemplated the 
appropriate remedy for a violation of a hearing deadline set by the Bail 
Reform Act of 1984.39  The Act provides that: 
The judicial officer shall hold a hearing to determine whether any 
condition or combination of conditions . . . will reasonably assure 
the appearance of such person as required and the safety of any 
other person and the community . . . .  The hearing shall be held 
immediately upon the person’s first appearance before the judicial 
officer unless that person, or the attorney for the government, 
seeks a continuance. Except for good cause, a continuance on 
motion of the person may not exceed five days, and a continuance 
on motion of the attorney for the Government may not exceed 
three days.  During a continuance, such person shall be 
detained . . . .  The person may be detained pending completion of 
the hearing.40   
United States Customs Agents found approximately 72 pounds of cocaine 
hidden in Montalvo-Murillo’s truck at a New Mexico checkpoint near the 
international border on February 8, 1989.41  Montalvo-Murillo agreed to 
cooperate with Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) authorities and make a 
controlled delivery of the cocaine to purchasers in Chicago.42  The transaction 
was not completed, however, because the purchasers failed to arrive at the 
drop point in Chicago.43   
On Friday, February 10, a transfer hearing for Montalvo-Murillo was held 
before a Magistrate in the Northern District of Illinois to arrange for the 
transfer of Montalvo-Murillo back to New Mexico where charges had been 
filed against him.44  Montalvo-Murillo was returned to New Mexico that 
evening.45  
On Monday, February 13, the Magistrate’s office in New Mexico 
scheduled a detention hearing for Thursday, February 16, which the court, 
sua sponte, ordered to be continued until the next Monday due to a lack of a 
                                                                                                                 
 39. See 495 U.S. at 713.  
 40. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (2000). 
 41. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. at 714-15. 
 42. Id. at 715. 
 43. Id.  
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
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prepared report by the Pretrial Services Office.46   Because that Monday fell 
on a holiday, the hearing was actually set for Tuesday, February 21.47  At the 
hearing, the Magistrate ordered the release of Montalvo-Murillo with $50,000 
bond and other conditions because he was not deemed to be a flight risk or a 
danger to the community or persons therein.48  
The District Court of New Mexico decided on review that, although 
nothing assured Montalvo-Murillo’s appearance or the community’s safety, 
Montalvo-Murillo should be released.49  The court ruled that “the detention 
hearing had not been held upon respondent’s first appearance as specified by 
section 3142(f), and that pretrial release on conditions was the appropriate 
remedy for violation of the statutory requirement.”50  The Tenth Circuit 
agreed and affirmed the district court’s ruling.51  
The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit, holding that “a failure to 
comply with the first appearance requirement does not defeat the 
Government’s authority to seek detention of the person charged.”52  
According to the Court, “[T]here is no presumption or general rule that for 
every duty imposed upon the court or the government and its prosecutors 
there must exist some corollary punitive sanction for departures or omission, 
even if negligent.”53  
Thus, for one type of deadline—speed-seeking deadlines—the Supreme 
Court ruled that missing the statutory deadline, regardless of the mandatory 
language used, did not strip a court of any authority to act upon the provision 
to which the deadline relates.54     
B. Eberhart v. United States: Claims-Processing Deadlines 
In Eberhart v. United States, the Supreme Court considered the remedy for 
missing the deadline for filing a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 
33(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.55  Rule 33(b)(2) 
provides that “any motion for a new trial grounded on any reason other than 
                                                                                                                 
 46. Id.  
 47. Id.  
 48. Id. at 715-16.  
 49. Id. at 716 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id.  
 52. Id. at 717.  
 53. Id. 
 54. See id. at 721 (stating “[w]e do not agree that we should, or can, invent a remedy to 
satisfy some perceived need to coerce the courts and the government into complying with 
the statutory time limits”).  
 55. See 546 U.S. 12, 13 (2005) (per curiam).  
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newly discovered evidence must be filed within 7 days after the verdict or 
finding of guilty, or within such further time as the court sets during the 7-
day period.”56   
Eberhart was convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine.57  On the final 
day for post-trial motions, Eberhart “moved for judgment of acquittal or, in 
the alternative, for a new trial,” raising as his sole argument that there was a 
“flaw in the transcript that had been published to the jury.”58  About six 
months later, he filed an addendum to support his motion, which listed two 
additional grounds for relief—“[A]dmission of potential hearsay testimony 
into evidence, and the District Court’s failure to give a so-called ‘buyer-seller 
instruction’ to the jury.”59  The government did not oppose the motion 
because of its untimeliness, but rather objected on its merits.60  
The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois awarded Eberhart a 
new trial, concluding that although none of the three grounds alone, nor any 
two as a pair, would warrant a new trial, the three arguments taken together 
warranted a new trial in the interest of justice.61  The government appealed 
the ruling, focusing on the untimeliness of Eberhart’s supplemental 
addendum and arguing that the district court abused its discretion in granting 
a new trial.62  The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court, holding that the 
district court lacked jurisdiction to grant a new trial because the deadline in 
Rule 33 is a jurisdictional deadline which strips a court of jurisdiction to act 
once that deadline has lapsed.63  According to the Seventh Circuit, even 
amendments to timely filed actions are outside the court’s jurisdiction to 
entertain.64    
The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit,65 holding that Rule 33 
was not a jurisdictional deadline, but rather a claims-processing rule.66  
Claims-processing rules differ from jurisdictional rules in that claims-
processing rules “assure relief to a party properly raising them, but do not 
compel the same result if the party forfeits them.”67  Jurisdictional rules, on 
                                                                                                                 
 56. FED. R. CRIM. P. 33(b)(2) (2005) (amended 2009).  
 57. Eberhart, 546 U.S. at 13.  
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 13-14.  
 61. Id. at 14.  
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 20.  
 66. Id. at 19.  
 67. Id. 
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the other hand, refer to “prescriptions delineating the classes of cases 
(subject-matter jurisdiction) and the persons (personal jurisdiction) falling 
within a court’s adjudicatory authority.”68   
Thus, Eberhart articulated a distinction between jurisdictional deadlines 
and claims-processing deadlines,69  ruling that claims-processing deadlines 
may be missed without sanction as long as neither party asserts the missed 
deadline issue prior to a decision on the merits.70     
C. Bowles v. Russell: Jurisdictional Conditions 
In Bowles v. Russell, the Supreme Court considered the penalty for 
missing a jurisdictional deadline such as filing a notice of appeal.71  At issue 
in the case was Rule 4(a)(6) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
which reads: “The district court may reopen the time to file an appeal for a 
period of 14 days after the date when its order to reopen is entered, but only 
if all the following conditions are satisfied . . . .”72  
Bowles was convicted of murder in 1999 for his participation in the 
beating death of Ollie Gipson and sentenced to imprisonment.73  After an 
unsuccessful direct appeal, Bowles filed a habeas corpus application which 
was denied on September 9, 2003.74   Following the date of entry of final 
judgment, Bowles failed to file a notice of appeal within thirty days, but he 
moved to reopen the appeals period for fourteen days pursuant to Rule 
4(a)(6).75  On February 10, 2004, the District Court for the Northern District 
of Ohio ordered the appeals period to be reopened, but not for the fourteen 
days pursuant to Rule 4(a)(6).76  Rather, the court reopened the period for 
seventeen days, without explaining any reason for the longer period.77  
Bowles filed his notice of appeal within the seventeen days allowed by the 
court, but after the fourteen days required by Rule 4(a)(6).78  The Sixth 
Circuit ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case because the notice of 
Bowles’ appeal failed to meet the deadline requirements of Rule 4(a)(6), 
                                                                                                                 
 68. Id. at 16.  
 69. See id. 
 70. Id. at 19.  
 71. See 551 U.S. 205, 206 (2007). 
 72. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(6) (emphasis added).  
 73. Bowles, 551 U.S. at 207.  
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
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noting that such a deadline “is mandatory and jurisdictional” and “not 
susceptible to equitable modification.”79  
The Supreme Court agreed with the Sixth Circuit.80  The Court noted that 
“the taking of an appeal within the prescribed time is ‘mandatory and 
jurisdictional.’”81  Within constitutional bounds, the Court said, Congress 
holds the power to determine the subject-matter and class of cases that federal 
courts may hear.82  According to the Court, “[b]ecause Congress specifically 
limited the amount of time by which district courts can extend the notice-of-
appeal period . . . that limitation is more than a simple ‘claims-processing 
rule.’”83  
Thus, Bowles suggests that the only type of deadline which strips a court 
of authority to extend it sua sponte is a jurisdictional deadline.        
IV. United States v. Dolan 
A. Statement of the Case 
On February 8, 2007, Brian Dolan pled “guilty to a federal charge of 
assault resulting in serious bodily injury.”84  The plea agreement stated that 
the court could order Dolan to pay restitution to his victim.85  According to 
the presentence report, however, restitution was not optional—it was 
required.86  In spite of this requirement, the court did not recommend an 
amount of restitution because it lacked sufficient information to do so.87   
On July 30, 2007, the day of Dolan’s sentencing hearing, the district court 
judge “sentenced Dolan to 21 months imprisonment along with 3 years of 
supervised release.”88  Even though ordering restitution was mandatory, the 
judge delayed doing so but warned Dolan that such a restitution order would 
be made in the future.89  On August 8, the court entered a judgment that 
                                                                                                                 
 79. Id. at 207-08. 
 80. Id. at 208.  
 81. Id. at 209 (citing Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 61 (1982) 
(per curiam)). 
 82. Id. at 212-13.  
 83. Id. at 213.  
 84. Dolan v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2533, 2537 (2010).  
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
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stated restitution would not be entered at that time due to a lack of sufficient 
information regarding the amount owed.90   
On October 5 (twenty-three days before the MVRA’s ninety-day 
restitution deadline), the probation office “prepared an addendum to the 
presentence report . . . which reflected the views of the parties, and which the 
judge later indicated he had received.”91  Within the addendum, the amount 
of restitution due in the case totaled approximately $105,000.92   
The sentencing court scheduled Dolan’s restitution hearing for February 4, 
2008, almost three months after the MVRA’s ninety-day deadline for 
ordering restitution had lapsed.93  At the hearing, Dolan argued that the court 
could no longer order restitution, pointing out that the ninety-day deadline for 
ordering such restitution had already expired.94  The court, however, did not 
find the argument convincing and ordered Dolan to pay restitution.95  On 
appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed.96   
Thus, the question before the Supreme Court concerned the remedy for 
missing the ninety-day deadline to impose restitution under § 3664(d)(5) of 
the MVRA, given that the text of the statute does not explicitly address the 
consequences of missing the deadline. 
B. The Court’s Decision 
The Court began its discussion by noting that the parties did not dispute 
whether the ninety-day deadline had lapsed, whether the sentencing court had 
sufficient information to impose restitution prior to the deadline, or whether 
the court had any reasons for missing the deadline.97  The only question 
before the Court was what remedy should be imposed, if any, for missing the 
ninety-day deadline.98   
The Court determined the answer by looking to the “statutory language, to 
the relevant context, and to what they reveal about the purposes that a time 
limit is designed to serve.”99  In some cases, according to the Court, the 
statutory deadline is a “jurisdictional” deadline—one that acts to cut off, for 
instance, “a court’s authority to hear a case, to consider pleadings, or to act 
                                                                                                                 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id.  
 97. See id. at 2538.  
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upon motions that a party seeks to file.”100  In such instances, allowing the 
deadline to expire results in an absolute bar of the court’s authority to 
disregard the deadline.101  Such deadlines cannot be waived or extended for 
any equitable reasons.102   
In other circumstances, the Court stated, a deadline is merely a tool for 
regulating the “timing of motions or claims brought before the court.”103  
Such deadlines are not a limitation on the court’s jurisdiction and may be 
classified as “claims-processing” rules.104  The party who seeks the 
deadline’s protection forfeits that protection unless that party notifies the trial 
court that the other party missed the deadline.105  For example, if a party 
wishes to benefit from the lapsing deadline (e.g., claim that a party lacks the 
ability to file for a new trial because they missed the deadline for doing so), 
that party must first have pointed out to the trial court, prior to a decision on 
the merits, that the deadline was in fact missed.    
Finally, the Court noted that in other instances, a deadline “seeks speed by 
creating a time-related directive that is legally enforceable but does not 
deprive a judge or public official of the power to take the action to which the 
deadline applies if the deadline is missed.”106   
The Court decided that the ninety-day deadline imposed by the MVRA is a 
“speed-seeking” deadline and that when the deadline is missed, the court 
retains the power to order restitution pursuant to the MVRA.107  The Court 
considered several factors in reaching this decision. 
First, according to the Court, when a statute is silent as to the consequence 
of failing to comply with a timing provision, “federal courts will not in the 
ordinary course impose their own coercive sanction.”108  In this context, a 
statute’s use of the word “shall” does not automatically bar an authority from 
taking action once the deadline has lapsed.109  
Second, the Court considered the “primary weight” of the text and noted 
that the Act’s importance centers on “imposing restitution upon those 
convicted of certain federal crimes.”110  The Court also noted that the MVRA 
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amended an older provision that permitted, but did not mandate, restitution 
orders, and emphasized that the wording of the statute mandates full 
restitution to victims “notwithstanding any other provision of law.”111  
Third, the Court found that the procedural provisions included in the Act 
reinforce the primary substantive purpose of the statute to assure full 
restitution for victims of certain crimes.112  The Court acknowledged that 
speed is indeed important, noting that several provisions do provide for 
timely fact-gathering to decide the proper restitution amount,113 but decided 
that the speed sought is primarily for the benefit of the victims and only 
secondarily for the benefit of the defendant.114 
The Court also paid close attention to § 3664(d)(5) of the Act, which 
reads: “If the victim subsequently discovers further losses, the victim shall 
have 60 days after discovery of the losses in which to petition the court for an 
amended restitution order.”115  Because this provision essentially allows a 
court to change the restitution amount at any point subsequent to the initial 
restitution order, the Court believed that in conjunction with the Act’s 
substantive purpose of providing full restitution, the speed sought by the 
deadline is designed for prompt restitution for the victim and not to provide 
certainty to defendants as to the amount of restitution.116  
Fourth, the Court turned its attention to the harm that would be caused to 
third parties who are not responsible for missing the deadline.117  Here, the 
victim of the crime would be deprived of receiving restitution not because he 
failed to meet the deadline, but because the court failed to meet the 
deadline.118  The threat of such harm that would be imposed by an alternative 
interpretation of the statute strongly supports the idea that Congress did not 
intend forfeiture to be the penalty for missing the deadline.119   
Fifth, the Court noted that it has considered the same issue with similar 
statutes and has refused to view the lapsing of the deadline as operating as a 
bar to action by the court.120  In Montalvo-Murillo, the Court ruled that when 
a judicial officer missed a deadline imposed by the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 
which mandated that a hearing be held “immediately upon the person’s first 
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appearance before the judicial officer,” the judicial officer was not required to 
release the person.121  Allowing the lapsed deadline to require the release of 
the detainee would controvert the aim of the Bail Reform Act—namely, 
preventing the release of dangerous detainees and avoiding the likely 
commission of crimes.122  
In the case of the MVRA’s ninety-day deadline, denying the restitution 
order based on missing the deadline would defeat the Act’s purpose.123  Also, 
such a remedy would be disproportionate to any harm inflicted upon the 
defendant through delay, especially in light of the fact the defendant in this 
case knew before the ninety-day deadline lapsed that restitution would be 
ordered.124   
Sixth, a defendant possesses the ability to mitigate harm caused by a 
missed deadline, especially if the defendant “obtains the relevant information 
regarding the restitution amount before the 90-day deadline expires.”125  
Additionally, a defendant worried about missing the deadline may simply 
point out to the court the potential error, prompting the court to set a timely 
hearing.126  In the event the court fails to meet the statutory deadline imposed, 
the defendant may resort to seeking mandamus.127   
Because the six considerations just discussed led the Court to determine 
that the MVRA’s ninety-day deadline is a “speed-seeking” deadline, the 
Court held that “[t]he fact that a sentencing court misses the statute’s 90-day 
deadline, even through its own fault or that of the government, does not 
deprive the court of the power to order restitution.”128  
V. Analysis of the Decision 
A. The Court Eviscerated the Plain Meaning of the MVRA and Legislated 
from the Bench 
The central issue presented in Dolan implicates the bigger issue of 
statutory interpretation.  The Court looked not only to the language of the 
statute, but also to its legislative purpose, citing the MVRA’s legislative 
history.129  Detractors of the Court’s opinion, however, will focus on the 
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words alone of the statutory text, believing that the text is clear enough on its 
face to render a decision.130  While resolution of this difference depends on 
whether one subscribes to the textualist or traditional theory of statutory 
interpretation, the Court’s decision is about much more than how it interprets 
the statute; it is about whether or not it ultimately legislated from the bench.    
The Supreme Court has previously stated that “[g]iven a straightforward 
statutory command, there is no reason to resort to legislative history.”131  
According to Justice Antonin Scalia, the reason a court should be bound by 
the text of the statute rather than the legislative purpose of the statute is 
because “[j]udges interpret laws rather than reconstruct legislators’ 
intentions.  Where the language of those laws is clear, [judges] are not free to 
replace it with an unenacted legislative intent.”132  Justice Scalia’s view of 
statutory interpretation sits squarely within the bedrock constitutional notion 
of separation of powers which serves to protect the integrity and 
independence of the different branches of government.133  Indeed, even prior 
to the rise of Justice Scalia as the champion of the textualist school of 
thought, the Supreme Court wisely stated: 
The primary and general rule of statutory construction is that the 
intent of the lawmaker is to be found in the language that he has 
used. He is presumed to know the meaning of words and the rule 
of grammar. . . .  No mere omission, no mere failure to provide for 
contingencies, which it may seem wise to have specifically 
provided for, justify any judicial addition to the language of the 
statute.134  
In this case, the majority looked to the purpose of the Act—providing full 
restitution to crime victims—and to the legislative history of the deadline 
provision, which they determined to have a speed-seeking intent primarily for 
the benefit of the victim and only secondarily for the benefit of the 
defendant.135  To arrive at that conclusion, the Court used not only the 
legislative history of the MVRA, but also one of its enacted provisions.136  
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The Court interpreted § 3664(d)(5), which provides, “If the victim 
subsequently discovers further losses, the victim shall have 60 days after 
discovery of those losses in which to petition the court for an amended 
restitution order,” to mean that Congress intended for restitution to be ordered 
after the ninety-day deadline has lapsed.137  The Court then rhetorically asked 
the dissenters how their interpretation of the MVRA—that missing the 
ninety-day deadline strips a court of the authority to order restitution—would 
make any sense in light of the majority’s reading of the statute.138    
The answer is that Congress not only absolutely intended victims to recoup 
full and accurately calculated restitution but also foresaw the need for the 
ability of a court to amend restitution past the ninety-day deadline.  Congress 
anticipated that inaccuracies would occur when deciding the amount of 
restitution to be ordered.  As such, Congress explicitly included in the 
MVRA a provision that gives a court the power to change the amount of a 
restitution order; however, that provision requires that the court make an 
initial restitution order that may be amended.139  By allowing a court to order 
restitution, for the first time, after the ninety-day deadline has lapsed, the 
Court has essentially deleted a provision from the MVRA and replaced it 
with its own judicially created provision, ignoring the plain meaning of the 
statute as explicitly embodied in § 3664(d)(5), and thereby legislating from 
the bench.    
The majority took legislative intent as carte blanche to effectuate the 
overarching goal of the MVRA, even in the face of a contrary plain reading 
of the statute that requires a timely restitution order.  The Supreme Court has 
already spoken on the issue of allowing legislative intent to run awry in 
statutory interpretation:  “no legislation pursues its purposes at all costs. . . . it 
frustrates rather than effectuates legislative intent simplistically to assume 
that whatever furthers the statute’s primary objective must be the law.” 140     
In addition to ignoring the plain language of the statute, the majority’s 
decision may inevitably frustrate the purpose of the deadline provision in the 
MVRA.  The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, after 
review of the MVRA’s ninety-day deadline provision, determined that “the 
purpose behind the statutory ninety-day limit on the determination of victims’ 
losses is not to protect defendants from drawn-out sentencing proceedings or 
to establish finality; rather, it is to protect crime victims from the willful 
                                                                                                                 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 2544.  
 139. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5) (2000).  
 140. Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525-26 (1987) (per curiam). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2012
228 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:211 
 
 
dissipation of defendants’ assets.”141  By allowing a court to miss the ninety-
day deadline for ordering restitution with impunity, the Court opens the door 
for victims to lose their ability to collect restitution by giving defendants a 
larger window of time to dispose of their assets.  
B. The Court Ignored the Rule of Lenity and Violated the Separation of 
Powers 
The Court chose not to follow the plain language of the statute in its 
interpretation of the MVRA, thus, it willingly waded into the uncertain 
waters of statutory construction and interpretation.  By doing so, the Court 
ignored default rules of interpretation, thereby violating the constitutional 
principle of separation of powers.  One default rule for interpreting 
ambiguous criminal statutes is the rule of lenity:  “ambiguity concerning the 
ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.”142  Lenity 
provides that ambiguous criminal statutes are to be interpreted against the 
government.  The rule of lenity, however, is not automatically invoked 
anytime ambiguity exists; it is invoked only when a “grievous ambiguity or 
uncertainty in the language and structure of the Act”143 remains after 
“seiz[ing] everything from which aid can be derived”144 and when “such an 
interpretation can be based on no more than a guess as to what Congress 
intended.”145   The Court in Dolan quickly dismissed Dolan’s argument for 
the application of the rule of lenity and argued that the rule has not been 
applied “to a statutory time provision in the criminal context” and that the 
ambiguity was not sufficient to warrant the use of the rule in this context.146   
Undoubtedly, the Court did not believe that there was any “grievous” 
ambiguity warranting the rule of lenity’s use.147  Indeed, it is difficult to 
imagine what type of ambiguity in a deadline provision is grievous enough to 
warrant the rule of lenity’s traditional invocation.  The rule has traditionally 
been invoked to ensure that defendants receive proper notice concerning what 
acts are prohibited, with a goal of avoiding any “grievous” due process issues 
while also reinforcing the notion that the judiciary does not share the same 
legislative powers as the legislature.148  At least one scholar, however, has 
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argued that while notice does play a role in statutory interpretation, “actual 
notice seems less central than does separation of powers.”149  From the 
perspective of separation of powers, there may be no more grievous of an 
ambiguity than one that results in one branch of government encroaching 
upon the power of another branch, such as the Supreme Court rewriting 
legislation.  Yet this is what the Court in Dolan was forced to do by 
abandoning the straightforward command of the MVRA’s text.  The Court 
forced itself to disregard the express requirement of issuing an initial 
restitution order prior to the deadline and, instead, imposed an optional 
deadline. 
As a statutory canon that favors the politically powerless, the application 
of the rule of lenity serves the purpose of effectuating clarity in statutes and 
“elicit[ing] legislative reactions that more precisely indicate which 
preferences are enactable.”150  It seems counterintuitive, as a bare matter of 
legislative intent, for a court to interpret any criminal statute in favor of 
criminal defendants since most legislatures tend to draft such statutes with the 
intent of punishing criminals.151  However, by interpreting criminal statutes 
narrowly, problems are more likely to be addressed by legislative 
amendments that clarify the statute’s meaning in light of an unfavorable 
interpretation by a court, thereby maintaining the expected separation of 
powers between the judicial and legislative branches.152 
The Court in Dolan was also concerned that the rule of lenity previously 
had not been applied to a criminal statute’s time provision.153  Yet, such an 
application of the rule of lenity is not a novel idea.  In United States v. 
Jolivette, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit faced the 
exact issue presented in Dolan, namely, whether the lapsed ninety-day 
deadline in the MVRA strips a court of authority to order restitution.154  The 
Sixth Circuit did not apply the rule of lenity because it found the command of 
Congress present in the plain meaning of the statute, prohibiting a court from 
ordering restitution past the deadline.155  It stated, however, that had the intent 
of Congress not been apparent in a plain reading of the statute, the court 
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would have “appl[ied] the well-settled rule requiring that any ambiguity in 
criminal statutes be resolved against the government and in favor of the 
criminal defendant.”156  
Dolan presented the first opportunity for the Court to apply the rule of 
lenity to a deadline provision of a criminal statute.157  Absent a plain textual 
meaning that clarified that a sentencing court must order restitution within a 
specified time period, the Court faced an ambiguity as to the consequences of 
a lapsed deadline.  Although the Court sought to clarify the legislative intent 
of Congress, ambiguity remains as to why Congress would include a 
mandatory deadline and an additional provision providing for amending a 
restitution order, if it simply intended for a court to be able to violate the 
deadline with impunity.  Moreover, although the Court recognized that the 
rule of lenity has never been applied by the Supreme Court to a timing 
provision, an ambiguity which causes the grievous mistake of not 
maintaining the separation of powers between the Court and Congress should 
be enough to invoke the rule of lenity in a deadline case of this nature.    
C. Montalvo-Murillo: A False Parallel 
One of the weakest aspects of the majority’s opinion in Dolan is its 
reference to, and reliance upon, United States v. Montalvo-Murillo as a 
parallel case.158  This reliance weakens the Dolan opinion not only because of 
the Court’s use of an arbitrary category for interpreting a statute, but also 
because the circumstances of Montalvo-Murillo do not parallel the 
circumstances in Dolan as well as the majority would like.  Specifically, the 
result in Dolan effects a stated legislative goal but does not effectuate any 
common law goal of punishment in criminal law, while the result in 
Montalvo-Murillo does both.     
Montalvo-Murillo addressed the appropriate remedy for missing the 
hearing deadline provision of the Bail Reform Act of 1994.159  That provision 
states that a detention hearing “shall be held immediately upon the person’s 
first appearance before the judicial officer unless that person, or the attorney 
for the Government, seeks a continuance.”160  The Court explicitly held that 
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“a failure to comply with the first appearance requirement does not defeat the 
Government’s authority to seek detention of the person charged.”161  
Additionally, the Court emphasized that its ruling was consistent with its 
interpretation of the purpose of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 “as an 
appropriate regulatory device to assure the safety of persons in the 
community and to protect against the risk of flight.”162   
In Dolan, the Court explicitly paralleled its reasoning for effectuating the 
purpose of the MVRA to that of Montalvo-Murillo, saying, “As in Montalvo-
Murillo, [to hold otherwise] would defeat the basic purpose of the Mandatory 
Victims Restitution Act.”163  The majority’s ruling in Dolan, however, 
blatantly parallels the two cases without a close examination of the 
circumstances in each case and ignores a key difference between them.  
The key difference between the decisions in Montalvo-Murillo and Dolan 
is that the result in Montalvo-Murillo furthers a well-established goal of 
criminal law writ large, which is to restrain dangerous individuals from 
harming society,164 while the result in Dolan simply furthers the MVRA’s 
narrower legislative goal of providing full restitution to victims of certain 
already-proscribed crimes.165  Without doubt, the legislative intent is 
considered by many to be an important factor in interpreting the meaning of a 
statute,166 but the Supreme Court has also stated that this factor should not be 
pursued at all costs.167   
From the textualist perspective, the decision in Montalvo-Murillo runs 
counter to a plain reading of the text of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 which 
commands that a detention hearing be held at the first appearance before a 
judicial officer.168  The Montalvo-Murillo decision, however, at least 
reinforces the commonly recognized goal and theory of punishment in 
criminal law:  “emphasis is more on the prevention of the undesirable than on 
the encouragement of the desirable.”169  By allowing the defendant’s release 
in the face of a lapsed deadline, the Court would have made a ruling that ran 
counter to the very foundation of criminal law, which is to protect citizens 
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from the unscrupulous.  Specifically, such a ruling would have failed to 
effectuate the criminal law goal of “restraint.”170  Indeed, states (the 
traditional arbiters of criminal law) have announced a similar rationale to 
statutory interpretation, with one court stating: 
It is within the province of the court, and, indeed, it is its duty, to 
render such an interpretation of the laws as will best subserve the 
ends of justice and the protection of the public, in so far as this 
may be done in accordance with well-established rules of 
construction.171 
The decision announced in Dolan, however, does not share the same 
foundational and factual support that existed in Montalvo-Murillo.  A 
legitimate parallel cannot be made.  Unlike Montalvo-Murillo, the decision in 
Dolan furthers a legislative goal that exists separate from the traditional 
goals underpinning the foundation and existence of criminal law.  By 
allowing the deadline to lapse without consequences, the Court not only 
strayed from a plain reading of the language in the MVRA requiring a timely 
restitution order—mandatory language which Congress chose to use—but the 
majority’s decision also failed to effectuate any common law goal of 
punishment central to criminal law.  
In Dolan, Brian Dolan suffered the consequences of his actions.  He was 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment and had already been released from 
prison when the district court ordered restitution on April 24, 2008.172  Thus, 
the district court imposed its restitution order upon Dolan after he had served 
his prison sentence.173  Unlike the Court in Montalvo-Murillo, the Court in 
Dolan lacked any broader goals of criminal law to justify its decision to allow 
legislative intent to override the plain meaning of the MVRA.  Unlike 
Montalvo-Murillo, society was neither in danger nor in need of protection 
from Brian Dolan.  Unlike Montalvo-Murillo, ignoring the plain meaning of 
the statute did not serve a broader purpose of criminal law.            
VI. Conclusion 
Some of the leading scholars on statutory interpretation summed up the 
state of affairs pessimistically, but accurately, stating, “The hard truth of the 
matter is that American courts have no intelligible, generally accepted, and 
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consistently applied theory of statutory interpretation.”174  Indeed, one current 
member of the Supreme Court has stated, “Surely this is a sad commentary: 
We American judges have no intelligible theory of what we do most.”175  
Such state of affairs has led at least one scholar to argue that courts should 
give a stare decisis effect to a court’s interpretation methodology to provide 
continuity and predictability within a court system.176  Yet, lacking 
consistency is only one effect of failing to have a uniform method of statutory 
interpretation.  The Court’s decision in Dolan illustrates a much graver effect 
of allowing courts to stray too far from the written words in a statute—
encroachment upon legislative powers by the judiciary.   
In Dolan, the Court chose to ignore the plain meaning of the statute’s 
language and instead embarked on a journey through the legislative history of 
the MVRA and its ninety-day restitution order deadline in order to arrive at a 
decision that essentially rewrites the language of the MVRA itself.  By doing 
so, the Court in Dolan veered off course from its role as an interpreter of the 
law and wandered into legislative territory by essentially deleting provisions 
that Congress explicitly wrote into the MVRA.  When the Court chose to 
ignore the plain meaning of the MVRA’s language, it was forced to enter into 
a mental exercise of divining the non-enacted intent of Congress.  Along the 
way, the Court ignored default rules for statutory construction and ignored 
key differences in cases that were essential to its reasoning.  By ignoring the 
plain language of the MVRA and a statutory default rule like the rule of 
lenity, the Court missed the opportunity to avoid blurring the separation of 
powers and legislated from the bench.   
 
Alexander J. Sisemore 
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